Strategies to improve Critical Infrastructures Robustness against the IEMI threat : a Review of relevant Standards and Guidelines on the topic by Simio, Francesca De et al.
Strategies to improve Critical Infrastructures
Robustness against the IEMI threat: a Review of
relevant Standards and Guidelines on the topic
Francesca De Simio1, Francesca De Cillis1, Giustino Fumagalli1,
Maria Carla De Maggio1, Stefan van de Beek2, John Dawson3, Linda Dawson3,
and Roberto Setola1
1Complex Systems & Security Lab, Universita` Campus Bio-Medico di Roma
Via A´lvaro del Portillo 21, 00128 Rome, Italy
f.desimio@unicampus.it,f.decillis@unicampus.it
giustinofumagalli@yahoo.it,m.demaggio@unicampus.it
r.setola@unicampus.it
2 Telecommunication Engineering Group, University of Twente, 7522 NB Enschede,
The Netherlands
g.s.vandebeek@utwente.nl
3Department of Electronics, University of York, Heslington, York, YO10 5DD, UK
john.dawson@york.ac.uk,l.dawson@york.ac.uk
Abstract. This paper aims to provide a brief overview of relevant stan-
dards, procedures and guidelines to standard bodies to manage the im-
pact of the Intentional ElectroMagnetic Interference (IEMI) threat. It
also provides guidelines for CI operators on how to reduce their expo-
sure on IEMI hazards.
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1 Introduction
Attacks by Intentional ElectroMagnetic Interference (IEMI) on Critical Infras-
tructure (CI) have become a significant threat in recent years due to the avail-
ability of suitable interference sources at low cost. Intentional ElectroMagnetic
Interference (IEMI), is in general defined as the intentional malicious gener-
ation of electromagnetic energy introducing noise or signals into electrical and
electronic systems, thus disrupting, confusing or damaging these systems for ter-
rorist or criminal purposes [1–3].
Recent years have seen the development of several international and Euro-
pean programs for CI Protection (CIP) such as the STRUCTURES [4] HIPOW
[5], and SECRET [6] projects to raise awareness among the community on CIP
and to support CI providers in the definition of specific and effective counter-
measures for CIP [7, 8]. This paper describes work undertaken as part of the FP7
European project STRUCTURES (Strategies for The impRovement of critical
2infrastrUCTUre Resilience to Electromagnetic attackS) [9]: Section 2 provides
a brief overview about the standards in the fields of Business Continuity Man-
agement (BCM), Risk Management (RM), Information Technology (IT) Security
and Information and Communication Technology (ICT) Security related to IEMI
threat. Section 3 presents the most relevant aspects to be taken into account for
providing guidelines to CI operators to reduce their exposures on IEMI hazards.
2 IEMI Threats and Standardization: the state of the art
# Standard Scope
Impacted
by introduction
of IEMI threat
Note
1 ISO/IEC 27001:2013 IT Security ×
2 ISO/IEC 27002:2013 IT Security
√
3 ISO/IEC 27005:2011 Risk Management
√
4 ISO/IEC 27011:2008 IT Security
√
Specific for telecommunication
5 ISO/IEC 27019:2013 IT Security
√
Specific for Energy sector
6 ISO/IEC 27031:2011
BC
Disaster Recovery
√
7 ISO/IEC 27033:2011 ICT Security ×
8 ISO/IEC 27035:2011
BC
Disaster Recovery
×
9 ISO 27799:2008 IT Security
√
Specific for Health sector
10 ISO/IEC 24762:2008
BC
Disaster Recovery
×
11 ISO 31000: 2009 Risk Management ×
12 ISO/IEC 31010:2009 Risk Management
√
13 ISO 22301:2012
BC
Disaster Recovery
×
14 ISO 22313:2012
BC
Disaster Recovery
×
15 ISO/PAS 22399:2007
BC
Disaster Recovery
×
16 ITSEC 1.2 ICT security ×
Critical equipments and applications
should be certified for security characteristics
against IEMI attack through these standards.
17 ISO 15408: 1999 ICT security
√ Note: ITSEC has been broadly replaced
by Common Criteria
18 ISO 13335-1:2004 ICT Security ×
19 ISO 13335-4:2000 ICT Security
√
20
BSI
(Bundesamt fur
Sicherheit in der
Informationstechnik)
Standard 100-3
Risk Management
√
DE only
21 TIA-942 IT Security
√ USA standard (ANSI) and
Electronic Industries Alliance (private sector).
22 ITU-K81:2009 IT Security
√ Reference document on intentional
EM threats protection
Table 1. List of Relevant Standards to IEMI threat for a CI.
Table 1 summarises European standards relevant to the protection of CI. As
part of complex standards framework, not all relevant documents listed in Table
1 mention to the IEMI threat. In a top-down approach, higher level documents
3usually refer to standardized management systems (such as IT Security Manage-
ment Systems - ISO27001 or BCM System - ISO22301) or define generic models
to be use in a broad context or are not related to a specific threat. It is our
opinion that all documents listed in Table 1 should devote specific sections to
the IEMI threat topic.
For completeness we also mention that the International Electrotechnical
Comission (IEC) produces a series of standards and technical reports on the
effects of electromagnetic interference on electronic systems in the IEC 61000
series such as the IEC61000-1-5 technical report on “High power electromagnetic
(HPEM) effects on civil systems” [10].
3 Guidelines for CI operators
Fig. 1. The BC and ISM cyclical process
In general, BC and Information Security Management (ISM) usually rely on
a cyclical process, which is arranged into several steps as described in Fig. 1.
Countermeasures such as physical separation of critical electronics from possible
sites for an attack, can be complemented by additional electromagnetic shielding
of buildings, equipment and cables depending on the assessment of risk and eval-
uation of the levels of susceptibility and criticality of each sub-system. Wireless
communications and navigation (e.g. GPS) systems which are becoming widely
used in infrastructure systems are particularly vulnerable to IEMI and difficult
to protect due to the low levels of signals at the receiver. Incident preparedness
should include some means of detecting an IEMI attack [11], otherwise system
failures may be incorrectly blamed on hardware failure or software errors. Detec-
tion of an attack also means that prompt action can be taken to detect the source
of the attack and manage other aspects of the incident. Savage and Radasky [12,
13] provide a more detailed view of the problem and possible solutions.
44 Conclusions
In this short paper we have been able to give only a brief overview of the available
standards and guidelines for to improve the robustness of CI. More information
and other relevant material can be found on the STRUCTURES project web
site [4].
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